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Elon Muskʼs announcement about the Neuralink project, which aims to
implant a chip with artificial intelligence in the brains of living beings1), seems to
have come out of a science fiction book. At the dawn of the third decade of the
twenty-first century, a dystopian future worthy of 19842) could be taking shape
ahead of us. Conversely, artificial intelligence could be the disruptive technology
that will be the foundation of our way of life in the coming decades, as the advent
of the Internet was at the beginning of the millennium.
This is why it is up to the legal standard to take up the questions relating to
artificial intelligence and ethics now in order to move towards a peaceful future.
Legal science must be the flight plan of artificial intelligence technologies in order
to avoid accidents. Moreover, the question of the legal framework of artificial
intelligence innovations is all the more relevant when health is at stake.
The use of artificial intelligence technologies in health and medicine is not new.
On the contrary, medical science has always evolved in line with discoveries3).
However, the technical computing power required to implement artificial
intelligence and the availability of vast amounts of data nowadays available have
enabled this technology to be incorporated into medicine4). We are then witnessing
the advent of connected health which includes telemedicine5), e-health6) and even
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1) Elon Musk, “An Integrated Brain-Machine Interface Platform with Thousands of Channels,”
Journal of Medical Internet Research, 21(10), (2019): p. 722; Abhinav Kulshreshth, Abhineet
Anand, Anupam Lakanpal, “Neuralink – An Elon Musk Start up Achieve symbiosis with
Artificial Intelligence,” ICCCIS, (2019).
2) From the eponymous novel: George Orwell, 1984, (Secker & Warburg, 1949).
3) Erwin H. Ackerknecht, A short History of Medicine, (Jhon Hopkins University Press, 2016).
4) Ray Kurzeil, The Singularity is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology, (Penguin, 2006).
5) Distance medicine: as defined by French code of public health: Art. L. 6316-1 Code de la
santé publique: “Telemedicine is a form of remote medical practice using information and
communication technologies”.
6) Digital health, defined by the WHO guidelines as “the use of information and communi-
cations technology in support of health and health-related fields”, WHO Guideline,
Recommendations on digital intervention for health system strengthening, (2019): p. 1 →
m-health7). These forms of connected health are facilitated by the use of artificial
intelligence and its accessibility. Furthermore, the use of artificial intelligence and
e-health helps in reducing costs and arise care8), therefore as long as this technology
is ethical it will lead health towards performance and efficiency.
The use of artificial intelligence in health is part of a context beyond
technology. The relationship between them is also necessarily social and ethical9).
Indeed, the issue here is the treatment of ill patients and therefore the performance
of health and hospital systems. Performance is defined by three objectives:
healthcare performance, obviously, but also economic performance and the respect
of ethics. Promoting one to the detriment of the other is not efficient10). We are
therefore trying to find out whether the use of artificial intelligence in medicine
allows an increase in care, a reduction in costs, and is not an obstacle in accessing
healthcare or in medical confidentiality.
Thus, it appears that the legal normative framework must absolutely allow a
balance between these objectives in order to guarantee performance. Artificial
intelligence cannot be used to supplement the human relationship between patient
and doctor11). Nor can it be a means of imposing a medical procedure on the
patient12). The massive use of data and artificial intelligence are only tools towards
health transformation that enhance human intelligence, both individual and
collective, in order to enable performance. However, several legal issues come into
conflict in the context of artificial intelligence-assisted medicine. Medical law,
governing the relations between the patient and the doctor, public health law,
governing the interactions between the national power and the population, but also
personal data and digital law, dealing with the rights of individuals to control their
data.
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→ (quoting the Assembly resolution WHA58.28 in WHO Resolutions and Decisions, (2005): p.
121).
7) Mobile health, defined by the WHO guidelines as “the use of mobile wireless technologies
for public health”, WHO Guidelines ibid. (quoting the Global Observatory for e-Health, M-
Health: new Horizons for health through mobile technologies, WHO, Global Observatory for
e-Health series, vol. 3, (2011): p. 6).
8) Magali Bouteille-Brigant, “Les enjeux de la e-santé au sein de la relation médicale,” Dalloz
IP/IT, 11, (2019): p. 593.
9) Ibid.
10) Michaël Krkac, “Lʼinterrogation croissante sur la conciliation entre éthique et performance,”
Revue droit & santé, 95, (2020), p. 488.
11) Magali Bouteille-Brigant, op. cit.
12) Michaël Krkac, op. cit.
Moreover, this assistance to human intelligence can take place throughout the
care process. As a result, this intervention undeniably raises questions of
responsibility in the event of errors, whether they be errors of interpretation by the
doctor or errors resulting from the medical device. According to the INSERM
(French national medical research institute), artificial intelligence is used in many
different ways. It can be used in cases of precision medicine and personalised
treatment, as a decision-making aid for the doctor and diagnosis aid, in assisted
surgery, or even in the use of companion robots13).
However, only artificial intelligence technologies that are used to prevent the
appearance or spread of diseases will be discussed here14). This involves predictive
medicine for a particular patient, but also prevention in the population. The
question of the use of artificial intelligence for preventive or predictive purposes is
far thornier because patients, who are not yet ill, are not bonded by a medical
contract15). It is only a question of preventing the appearance of diseases, as a
precautionary measure, and it is essential to know whether or not the legal norm
allows the potentially liberticidal use of artificial intelligence in the name of mere
precaution.
In this context, the use of artificial intelligence in health must be distinguished
in two cases. On the one hand, it can be at the service of an individual, and be used
in a predictive role (I), but it can also be at the service of the population in a
preventive context (II).
I. The use of artificial intelligence servicing the individual
The focus here is on the relationship between medical law, i.e. the relationship
between the doctor – or paramedic – and the patient, and digital and data law. This
relationship can be studied through the prism of two interactions. It is then
necessary to address the use of artificial intelligence when it aims to prevent
diseases (A), but also, when the disease is proven, its evolution (B).
A. Disease prevention
The prevention of diseases is first and foremost to be distinguished from
assistance in diagnosis. In the latter case, the patient is already suffering from
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13) INSERM, Intelligence artificielle et santé, (2018): https: //www. inserm. fr/information-en-
sante/dossiers-information/intelligence-artificielle-et-sante (accessed 27 october 2020).
14) Ibid. Which are also defined and mentioned by INSERM.
15) About medical contract and consent between parties: Gérard Mémeteau et al., Cours de droit
médical, (5th ed., LEH, 2016): §. 540.
symptoms and the doctor can use artificial intelligence, among other means such as
consulting a colleague, to help him in establishing a diagnosis. In this case, he
must ask the patient for his consent, except in emergencies or special cases16), in
order to be able to rely on a third party, whether human or not17). However, here
we are talking about people who have no symptoms nor visible signs of illness.
Therefore, the use of artificial intelligence by cross-referencing data, personal or
not, can anticipate the onset of the disease and detect it beforehand18). It must be
understood here that this is not a relationship between a patient and a doctor, but
between a consumer and a company, which offers its services in order to avoid
referral to a doctor.
This detection, this mystical prediction, is made possible by cross-referencing
data obtained from the person. This data can come from medical devices19), but
also more widely from all kinds of connected objects20). It is not the medical nature
of the data that makes this prediction possible, but rather the cross-referencing of
multiple data about the person, which may be personal on the one hand, or non-
personal on the other.
In Europe, personal data is regulated by the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR)21). Indeed, the regulation lays down the principle that when personal data
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16) Article L. 1111-4, Code de la santé publique.
17) In the case of a remote expertise (“télé-expertise”), where the doctor asks for an expertise
from a specialist. This procedure exists in French law since, 2010, and has been since more
and more used. Article R. 6316-1 2° Code de la santé publique. About consent and
conditions, articles R. 6316-2 and R. 6316-3, Code de la santé publique.
18) Cédric Villani et al., “Focus 2 – La santé à lʼheure de lʼIA,” Donner un sens à lʼintelligence
artificielle, (2018): p. 196 ; Emily Mullin, “Earlier diagnosis could help researchers to
develop drugs to slow the progress of the disease,” MIT Technology Review, vol. 121, n° 2,
(2018).
19) As defined by article 2 (1) of the Regulation (EU) 2017/745 of the European Parliament and
the Council of 5 April 2017 on medical devices, amending Directive 2001/83/EC, Regulation
(EC) n° 178/2002 and Regulation (EC) n° 1223/2009 and repealing Council Directives
90/385/EEC and 93/42/EEC, OJUE, (2017).
20) Meaning all sorts of IoT. About data collection: Bénédicte Bévière-Boyer, “Données
massives en santé : ébauche dʼun droit prospectif,” in Innovations en santé publique, des
données personnelles aux données massives (big data) : aspects cliniques, juridiques et
éthiques, Christian Hervé and Michèle Stanton-Jean, (ed. Dalloz, 2018): p. 93.
21) Regulation (EU), 2016/679 of the European Parliament and the Council of 27 April 2016, on
the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the
free movement of such data and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection
Regulation), OJEU, (2016).
is collected, the consent of the person from whom the data originates is mandatory,
not only with respect to the collection but also with respect to its use. The data
provider is entitled to know to what extent and for what purposes such data may be
used. The condition is, however, that the data must be “personal”22), i.e. that it
allows an individual to be identified. In the context of health data, these are also
qualified as “special”23), which leads to additional measures of precaution for the
collector. However, as previously explained, not all data useful for disease
prevention is necessarily “special” or sensitive. For example, a connected
refrigerator counting the number of times it is opened and recording the hours is
not a source of sensitive data. However, these data can be used for detecting
cardiovascular diseases or diabetes. Nevertheless, all these data must be personal,
as they are linked to an individual and must enable the prevention of his or her
illnesses.
Nonetheless, not all the data used are personal, since artificial intelligence in
its functioning will necessarily compare these data with scientific data, or at least
objective, and non-personal data. Indeed, this predictive analysis made by artificial
intelligence must be based on a known reference frame. Very often it will use Big
Data24).
However, in addition to measures enhancing the Big Data, the greatest legal
precaution is related to the use of personal data. Indeed, if in the context of a
medical device there is no doubt that the person who consents to the collection
consents to its medical use. In the context of data collection by ordinary connected
objects, consent to medical use is far more difficult to obtain25). Moreover, this case
presupposes that the data are collected by different companies. Therefore, it seems
complicated for the consumer to consent to the collection of data from each
collector only in the context of medical use. Data collection contracts are often
adhesion contracts26), and the consumer giving access to his data for medical
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22) In the sense of “personal data” defined by article 4 (1) of the GDPR,: “any information
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person”.
23) See article 9 (1) of the GDPR,: “Processing personal data […] concerning health […] shall
be prohibited”; the use of these data on preventive medicine or public health reasons is only
an exceptions granted by article 9 (1) (h) and (i).
24) François Bertucci et al., “Santé numérique et « cancer hors les murs », Big Data et
intelligence artificielle,” Bulletin du Cancer, Vol. 117, n°. 1, (2020): p. 102.
25) Claude Huriet, “Big Data : tous aliénés ?,” in Innovations en santé publique, des données
personnelles aux données massives (big data), op. cit., p. 25.
26) Article 6 (1) (b) GDPR,; Christiane Féral-Schuhl, Cyberdroit : le droit à lʼépreuve de
lʼinternet, (ed. Dalloz, 2020): §. 113-31 and following.
purposes frequently has to consent to multiple uses27). Moreover, this use by
multiple companies is sometimes made outside the userʼs national borders, which
implies additional complications28).
Imposing data collection in the name of health prevention is impossible. The
right to privacy takes precedence over this mere eventuality, all the more so as uses
outside the health context will be certain29). In addition, in the context of
prevention, it is impossible for the owner of the artificial intelligence to objectively
prove the effectiveness of the device. Indeed, its recommendations and alerts may
have made it possible to prevent and avoid the disease, just as they may have been
mistaken about its advent. It is therefore impossible to impose an obligation of
result on them.
Using therefore data as a preventive measure is a matter of contract law and
relies on the partiesʼ willingness to consent. It is therefore based on a relationship
of consent and trust between the parties and must be left to their discretion. It is
important to note here that consumers are at first free to decide whether or not to
purchase these devices, whether they are medical, paramedical or simply connected
objects, and secondly to consent to the collection of their data in their operation.
Even if their massive introduction would make it possible to reduce health costs, it
is impossible to impose the conclusion of a contract in an arbitrary manner.
B. Disease surveillance
Fundamentally, when the patientʼs illness is declared, it is no longer a question
of a contractual relationship, but of medical law governing the juridical relations
between the medical practitioner and the patient towards a better medicine30). This
is why it is no longer a question of contractual freedom, but of a tacit contract of
mutual trust between the patient and the doctor31). The patient is then a partner in
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27) Maïlys Michot-Casbas, Christian Hervé, “Introduction Les données massives en santé :
enjeux éthiques des Big Data dans la réaltité pratique du soin,” in Innovations en santé
publique, des données personnelles aux données massives (big data), op. cit., p. 1.
28) Such as international law enforcement.
29) Such as insurance fraud for instance.
30) Gérard Mémeteau et al., op. cit., §. 41, quoting: Jean Savatier, “Défense et illustration du
droit médical,” Archives de philosophie du droit, (1954-1955): p. 123.
31) Gérard Mémeteau et al., op. cit., §. 541; which is different from a mere consumeristic
relationship: Stéphane Prieur, “Retour sur la relation juridique de soins en tant que relation
consumériste,” in Mélanges en lʼHonneur de Gérard Mémeteau, Droit médical et éthique
médicale : regards contemporains, Bruno Py, François Vialla, Julie Leonhard, vol. 2, (ed.
LEH, 2015): p. 73 ff.
the therapeutic decision, but the doctor remains the decision-maker. This
relationship of trust is mentioned without being defined in the French Public
Health Code in article R. 4127-15, included in the medical code of ethics32), and in
accordance with Hippocratesʼ oath: “I would never deceive their trust”33).
Furthermore, article L. 1111-6 of the French Public Health Code mentions the
notion of “person of trust”, who is entitled, in the absence of the patientʼs capacity,
to take part in the therapeutic relationship. Consequently, if an outside person is to
be expressly appointed to this task, it appears that both parties to the tacit contract
of mutual trust have an active role in the therapeutic choice.
Therefore, in the context of this contract of mutual trust between the patient
and the practitioner, it should be noted that the patient trusts the doctor to
administer the best care and to use the best techniques known to science for this
purpose. The use of artificial intelligence, in order to predict the evolution of a
disease, most often chronic, and to tend towards recovery, could be tacit between
the doctor and the patient. However, the doctor has a number of tasks, including
informing the patient of the therapeutic method used34).
In fact, there is a mechanism that allows the doctor to refer to parties outside
the contract of mutual trust, to the human intelligence of fellow practitioners,
without violating medical confidentiality35). Now, if this procedure is possible, if
the doctor is given - or even summoned - the opportunity to choose the therapeutic
approach outside the relationship that binds him to the patient, it seems logical by
analogy that he can do likewise with a technology, a non-human intelligence.
Therefore, under the cover of the tacit relationship of trust and the patientʼs initial
authorisation, it can be deduced that the use of artificial intelligence in the
therapeutic decision-making process can be understood within the functions of the
doctor and can be used. This external aid of artificial intelligence can in particular
be used to assist in the choice of drug treatment. For example, in oncology, the
genomic profile of an individual can be compared with that of a similar individual
to establish an early diagnosis and predict the evolution of his health. His
biological profile can be detailed in order to provide him with the most
personalised treatment. This is what IBM is now experimenting with the artificial
intelligence called Watson, where in 30% of the cases submitted, Watson proposed
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32) Conseil National de lʼOrdre des Médecins, Code de déontologie médicale, (ed. CNOM
2019).
33) Serment dʼHippocrate, in : Code de déontologie médicale, op. cit., p. 33.
34) Magali Bouteille-Brigant, op. cit., p. 593.
35) Supra, footnote 17, about remote expertise.
more therapeutic options than the doctors36).
However, the use of personal data in the medical relationship cannot be tacit.
This assistance available to the doctor is subject to special provisions. The personal
data used must firstly be expressly identified and have the express consent of the
patient from whom it originates.
Firstly, the identification of personal data, the practitioner must carefully
delimit the information used in this procedure. In fact, an excess of personal
information that is useless for the diagnosis is not desirable. The CNIL, the French
organisation responsible for data protection and ensuring compliance with the
GDPR, warns that only 33% of people are aware of the use of artificial intelligence
during their medical procedures37). It therefore seems essential to identify the data
with the patient.
On the other hand, patients providing data are protected by the GDPR. Even
in the context of a medical relationship, consent to the collection and subsequent
use of data is essential. In this regard, the regime of data law and patientsʼ rights is
similar. Consent is the central element. Except in cases of emergency, or
incapacity38), the patientʼs consent is indispensable. In the context of data collection
and subsequent use of the data it is compulsory39). Moreover, in this respect, the
doctor is also subject to the requirements of the GDPR40). Therefore, in practice,
the patient signs a discharge allowing him to consent to care and to the use of
artificial intelligence in the context of his therapeutic care. However, the duration
of this consent remains unclear.
Furthermore, another point deserves attention, namely that of responsibility in
the event of progressive misdiagnosis. In addition to the questions of which doctor
or owner of the artificial intelligence is responsible41), another problem is the
question of responsibility in the event of conflicting diagnoses. Indeed, once the
doctor has used artificial intelligence, it is legitimate to ask whether or not he
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36) Morgan Grit, “Algorithmes et intelligence artificielle : les recommandations de la CNIL,”
Revue droit & santé, 82, (2018): p. 245.
37) CNIL, Comment permettre à lʼHomme de garder la main ? Les enjeux éthiques des
algorithmes et de lʼintelligence artificielle, (ed. CNIL, 2017): p. 21.
38) Unless represented by a person of trust. Art. L. 1111-6, Code de la santé publique.
39) Article 9 (1) (4) (i), GDPR.
40) Magali Bouteille-Brigant, op. cit.
41) Julia Sourd, “Intelligence artificielle, algorithmes : quelle réglementation pour quelle
responsabilité ?,” in E-Santé : les enjeux de la médecine de demain, Louise Delavenne,
Anne-Claire Hubert, (ed. LEH, 2018): p. 61.
should necessarily follow its therapeutic indications. Being the guardian of the
therapeutic decision42), he can freely choose not to follow them. Consequently, in
the event of an error, it is difficult to hold him responsible because he did not
follow the recommendations of the artificial intelligence, just as it is equally
difficult to hold him responsible when he has fully followed the indications
resulting from it.
This is why, although artificial intelligence can be an integral part of the
doctorʼs therapeutic arsenal and can be used in a relationship of mutual trust and
with the patientʼs informed consent, it cannot be imposed on the doctor. Artificial
intelligence in predictive medicine is a tool supporting the human intelligence of
the practitioner, not an obligation incumbent on him, nor a substitute to him.
II. The use of artificial intelligence for collective good
By contrast, the relationship between public health law, the role of the state
regarding population health, and digital and data law must be addressed here. Thus,
artificial intelligence can be used in a context of anticipating the appearance or
management of epidemics (or pandemics) (A), but also in the context of
pharmacovigilance (B).
A. Anticipating and managing epidemics
Anticipating epidemics is not easy. Nevertheless, thanks to digital resources, it
is now possible to increasingly anticipate any outbreaks on the horizon. The use of
artificial intelligence and machine learning algorithms makes it possible to
anticipate them. In the context of human flu, for example, it is possible to establish
a data panel containing information on seasonal epidemics in order to accurately
anticipate risk zones and seasons43). However, it is difficult to predict new
outbreaks, resulting from unknown factors such as those of Covid-19. However,
the data collected during this pandemic could serve as a basis for the prevention of
future ones, particularly those obtained in the context of its management.
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42) Meaning the doctor has a freedom of choice regarding the therapeutic response. Article L.
162-2, Code de la sécurité sociale. Defined by authors as the main principle granting the
trusting relation and ethics between patient and doctor: Gérard Mémeteau et al., op. cit., §.
325, quoting: Anne Laude et al., Le droit de la santé, (PUF-Thémis, 2007): p. 392; and
Geneviève Rebecq, La prescription médicale, (PUAM, 1998).
43) Jean-Phillippe Gilbert et al., “Un appel à un cadre éthique lors de lʼutilisation des données
des médias sociaux pour des applications dʼintelligence artificielle dans la recherche en santé
publique,” Le Relevé des Maladies Transmissibles au Canada, vol. 46, n° 6, (2020): p. 191.
Notheless, it is important to differentiate between the management of an
epidemic and its prediction. Indeed, the more or less urgent nature of management
one can legally justify derogations that the prediction cannot.
In the case of epidemics prediction, several types of data will be used:
objective, generic and non-personal data on the one hand, but also subjective,
precise and personal data on the other. The circulation and use of non-personal data
are guaranteed by European Union law44). Indeed, aware of the growing data
economy, the European single market is also free in the digital environment. The
use of such data for predictive purposes is encouraged and facilitated. This includes
scientific, statistical and global data. For example, it is possible to mention the
different age proportions in a given territory, the proportion of people at risk for
this disease - which presupposes that we know the causes and consequences - or
the habits of the population45).
However, these data will be further refined when cross-referenced with
personal data in an artificial intelligence algorithm. For example, there are
algorithms that can predict the evolution of the human flu according to the research
carried out by Internet users46). Here again, the collection of data from connected
objects makes it possible to predict behaviour, and therefore the outbreak or evolution
of an epidemic. In this respect, data collection remains subject to the GDPR, and
consent is no longer a medical act but a general personal data collection regime.
However, the doctor himself may be a source of data useful for the prediction
of epidemics. Indeed, he can communicate the number of patients received with a
particular disease, and then become a data manager subject to the GDPRʼs
sanctions, outside of the relationship that binds him to the patient, if he does not
make the data anonymous and does not prove his good diligence in terms of data
storage. Therefore, if no overriding interest justifies a derogation from the
principle, the collection of data cannot be freely used for the prevention of
epidemics.
However, when an epidemic is declared, and when it is a particularly virulent
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44) Regulation (EU) 2018/1807 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November
2018 on a framework for free flow of non-personal data in the European Union, OJEU,
(2018).
45) May be provided by the INSEE (Institut National de la Statistique et des Études
Économiques – French National institute of statistics) or research organisations on an
anonymous basis.
46) Fred S. Lu et al., “Improved state-level influenza nowcasting in the United-States leveraging
Internet-based data and network approaches,” Nature Communications, 10, (2019): art. 147.
pandemic justifying the establishment of a sui generis state of emergency, as
happened in France – and across the world – with Covid-19, it is legitimate to ask
whether the health emergency does not supplant the standards protecting personal
data to the benefit of emergency management. In this respect, it is appropriate to
focus on the particular case of tracing applications which emerged during the
Covid-19 pandemic, but which were not very successful in France, especially in the
context of European free movement47).
First of all, it is necessary to understand what the French health state of
emergency permits and which are the sources. Contrary to all expectations, the
French health state of emergency, established by the Law of 23 March 202048),
does not derive from the state of emergency provided by article 16 of the French
Constitution49). It also differs from the state of emergency introduced by the Law of
3 April 195550). It is in fact a sui generis regime whose only constitutional legitimacy
is a parliamentary ratification consolidated by a decision of the French Constitutional
Council51), which supports its legitimacy in the light of the “theory of exceptional
circumstances”52). It is therefore necessary to be cautious about infringements of per-
sonal freedoms, especially since the right to privacy is, on the other hand, enshrined
in international texts53). For example, the use of algorithms to track individuals and
manage the pandemic, even if it could be ethically justified, cannot be imposed.
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47) Marianne Long, Léa Paravano, Jean-Luc Sauron, “La protection des données à caractère
personnel,” La Semaine juridique Administrations et Collectivités territoriales, n° 41, (2020):
chr. n° 2256, §21.
48) Loi n°2020-290 du 23 mars 2020 dʼurgence pour faire face à lʼépidémie de covid-19, JORF,
24 March 2020, n° 0072.
49) Stating : “When the institutions of the Republic, the independence of the Nation, the integrity
of its territory or the fulfilment of its international commitments are threatened in a serious
and immediate manner and the regular functioning of the constitutional public authorities is
interrupted, the President of the Republic shall take the measures required by these circum-
stances”, Article 16, Constitution du 4 octobre 1958, as modified by Loi constitutionnelle n°
2008-724 du 23 juillet 2008 de modernisation des institutions de la Ve République, JORF, 24
July 2008, n° 0171.
50) Loi n° 55-385 du 3 avril 1955 relative à lʼétat dʼurgence, as modified by Loi n°2018-133 du
26 février 2018 portant diverses dispositions dʼadaptation au droit de lʼUnion européenne
dans le domaine de la sécurité, JORF, 27 February 2018, n° 0048.
51) Conseil Constitutionnel, Décision n°2020-800 DC du 11 mai 2020.
52) On that point: Didier Truchet, “Avant lʼétat dʼurgence sanitaire : premières questions,
premières réponses,” Revue française de droit administratif, n° 4, (2020): p. 597.
53) While the French Constitutional Council is competent for a constitutional review, it is not
qualified for treaty review.
Moreover, a second obstacle stands in front of these tracing applications.
Sometimes they are not managed directly by the government - which would not be
sufficient for their authorisation - but by private providers, often foreign54). In
France, however, it was decided that the StopCovid application would not involve
GAFAMs. Indeed, the application was based on Bluetooth technology and was able
to alert the user who had been in contact with a contaminated third party. A unique
identification number is assigned to each device and only this number is
transmitted to the Direction Générale de la Santé – a Ministry section of the
French health Department – so the usersʼ data remains contained on the device55).
However, this system, although anonymous, processes personal data and is subject
to the GDPR56). In this sense, a valid legal basis on consent should be discarded, as
Article 9 (2) (a) of the GDPR provides that, in the case of processing of data
related to health, only explicit consent is possible, as the processing of such data is
prohibited in principle57). Indeed, even if it is voluntary, the sanitary context does
not allow free and informed consent within the meaning of the GDPR58). The legal
basis chosen was Article 6 (1) and 9 (2) (i) of the Regulation59). These articles of
the GDPR provide exceptional data treatment in cases of “important public interest
ground” or “public interests grounds in the field of health”. However, such a basis
implies a “proportionate” use. It follows, therefore, that it is impossible to
generalise its use.
B. Pharmacovigilance
Another use of artificial intelligence in the context of health prevention
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54) As Germany adopted: Caroline Zorn, “État dʼurgence pour les données de santé :
lʼapplication StopCovid,” Dalloz Actualités, (12 May 2020). However, this solution would
not exclude a control from the national authority, in France it would be the CNIL: Conseil
dʼÉtat, 10e et 9e Ch. Réun., 19 juin 2020, Recueil Dalloz, n°36, (2020): note Fabienne Jault-
Seseke, p. 2043.
55) Décret n° 2020-650 du 29 mai 2020 relatif au traitement des données dénommé
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concerns pharmacovigilance. The ANSM (Agence Nationale de la Sécurité du
Médicament et des Produits de Santé - French Agency for Drug Safety), defines
pharmacovigilance as the monitoring of drugs and the prevention of risks of
undesirable effects resulting from their use60). The pharmacovigilance mission
therefore consists of monitoring the side effects of medicines, depending on their
design or use. The French Public Health Code expressly distinguishes between two
types of pharmacovigilance needing data management, i.e. blood-derived medicines
which must be traceable to their donor61), and pharmaco-dependency, or addict-
vigilance, which requires data to be collected on patientsʼ drug habits62). In both
cases, the use of artificial intelligence algorithms allows better analysis.
Nevertheless, in both cases, there are overlapping legal norms which do not
facilitate the implementation of artificial intelligence. On the one hand, medical
law provides for an obligation of confidentiality, and therefore the doctor cannot
freely transmit the data collected for pharmacovigilance purposes. On the other
hand, personal data law provides for the protection of sensitive data.
From a medical law approach, it should be noted that the doctor also has a duty
to report any adverse effects due to a medicinal product63). However, in this context, a
first contradiction appears within the field of medical law, on the one hand medical
confidentiality is imposed, on the other hand there is an obligation to report. However,
this contradictory duality can be supplemented by admitting that there is a possibility
of shared secrecy between the practitioner, the patient and the pharmacovigilance
organisation64). This shared secrecy nevertheless requires the patientʼs consent.
In parallel, when applied to the digital and algorithmic world, the informed
consent described by the GDPR in Article 9 (2) (a) for health data is indispensable.
Unless it is based, as in the case of tracking applications, on “important public
interest grounds”65) or “public interest grounds in the field of health”66). This second
basis does require proportionate use, and in the context of pharmacovigilance it is
easier to establish. Then, data management in this context could technically be
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included as a part of the confidentiality obligation binding on the doctor and be
treated as a whole.
This is why the use of artificial intelligence algorithms in the context of
pharmacovigilance can be made possible and more effective from a data processing
point of view, but effective mass processing cannot take place without a reform
aimed at reconciling the different obligations of the practitioner.
In summary, the use of artificial intelligence in predictive medicine, whether
personal or collective, is not favoured by the data protection regime, particularly
with regard to health data. For all that, although these measures and the use of
artificial intelligence technologies would allow better management of diseases and
increase healthy living, the risks involved do not allow the protective foundations
of privacy to be jeopardised. In the absence of more secure technology, and in
application of the precautionary principle, it is not possible to fully open up health
to artificial intelligence. Perhaps, however, if forthcoming technological inventions,
such as quantum computing, for example, make it possible to secure data with a
certain degree of security, then it will be possible to relax the legal standard in
favour of the widespread use of artificial intelligence in medicine.
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